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WITHOUT DISTINCTION: RECOGNIZING COVERAGE
OF SAME-GENDER SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNDER
TITLE VII
Trish K. Murphy
Abstract: Federal court decisions conflict regarding the applicability of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 to sexual harassment cases where the alleged harasser and victim are
members of the same gender. This Comment examines the courts' treatment of same-gender
sexual harassment claims and argues that same-gender sexual harassment claims fall within
the purview of Title VII as impermissible discrimination. In reaching this position, this
Comment demonstrates that Title VII lacks gender-based limitations. It then argues that no
valid justification exists for distinguishing between same-gender sexual harassment and
sexual harassment involving members of different genders. Finally, this Comment suggests
that the inquiry should focus on the discriminatory and unwelcome nature of the conduct
alleged.
Elizabeth suffered from sexual harassment at her place of
employment. Her supervisor, Terry, repeatedly made sexually explicit
comments to Elizabeth, also propositioning and touching her in a
sexually offensive manner. Terry failed to treat male employees
similarly. Unable to tolerate such conditions, Elizabeth filed a Title VII
sexual harassment claim in federal court.'
If Terry is male, Elizabeth should have little difficulty stating a Title
VII sexual harassment cause of action. However, if Terry is female,
Elizabeth has then alleged a same-gender sexual harassment claim.
Depending on the jurisdiction, Elizabeth may face defeat on summary
judgment for failure to show a prima facie case of discrimination under
Title VII.
Prior to 1988, Terry's gender would have been irrelevant because
courts agreed that Title VII covers sexual harassment regardless of the
gender of the harasser and victim.2 However, in Goluszek v. Smith,3 a
federal district court departed from established precedent by refusing to
recognize a Title VII claim brought by a male plaintiff against his
employer, alleging sexual harassment by his male co-workers. In 1994,
other courts began to follow suit.4 Consequently, federal court decisions
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988). For a description of the provisions of Title VII, see infra
part I.A.
2. See, e.g., Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537 (M.D. Ala. 1983), affd mem., 749
F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1984); Wright v. Methodist Youth Serv., 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
3. 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Il. 1988).
4. See, e.g., Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994). See also infra note 82.
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currently conflict regarding Title VII's application to same-gender sexual
harassment claims.
The U.S. Supreme Court has declared workplace sexual harassment
illegal and offensive to Title VII's broad rule of workplace equality.5
Courts refusing to recognize same-gender sexual harassment claims
enable employers to ignore egregious workplace conduct and deny
victims of such discrimination a federal remedy. With the increasing
willingness of courts to dismiss same-gender sexual harassment claims
on summary judgment, a rising number of plaintiffs are denied the civil
rights coverage to which they are properly entitled.
This Comment analyzes the problems inherent in recent federal court
decisions declining to extend Title VII coverage to victims of same-
gender sexual harassment. Part I describes the general parameters of
federal sexual harassment law. Part II then surveys the courts' treatment
of same-gender sexual harassment claims. Finally, part III argues that
Title VII coverage should include same-gender sexual harassment. This
section illustrates that Title VII lacks limitations based on gender and
that no justification exists for distinguishing between same-gender sexual
harassment and sexual harassment involving men'ers of different
genders. It then suggests that the crucial inquiry involves the
discriminatory and unwelcome nature of the conduct alleged.
I. TITLE VII AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT
A. Generally
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination by
an employer "against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, "because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."6 Title VII
prohibits sex discrimination against men as well as women.7
Although the language of Title VII fails to specifically address sexual
harassment, case law has established that Title VII proscribes such
conduct.8 These decisions derive from the principle that sexual
5. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370-71 (1993).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
7. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370; Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S.
669, 682 (1983); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1046 n.4 (3d Cir. 1977).
8. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897
(1lth Cir. 1982); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp.
654 (D.D.C. 1976) (recognizing for first time that sexual harassment constiutes sex discrimination),
1126
Vol. 70:1125, 1995
Same-Gender Sexual Harassment
harassment is no different from traditional discrimination because of
sex.9 Female employees file most sexual harassment complaints;
however, male employees also may state a sexual harassment cause of
action under Title VII"
Congress neither defined nor made clear in the legislative history what
it meant by "sex."" Courts have interpreted the term to refer to gender,
thus adopting a narrow construction as to sexuality. 2 Consequently,
federal courts uniformly decline to recognize sexual orientation
discrimination as actionable under Title VII, 3 rendering harassment
based solely on sexual orientation beyond the protections of the statute. 4
B. Theories of Liability
Sexual harassment encompasses two basic theories of liability: "quid
pro quo" and "hostile environment."' 5 Quid pro quo and hostile
environment sexual harassment possess differing characteristics but often
overlap. Accordingly, more than one theory of liability may apply in a
particular case. 6
vacated on other grounds sub noma. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978), aff'd on
remandsub nom. Williams v. Civiletti, 487 F. Supp. 1387 (D.D.C. 1980).
9. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64 (CWithout question, when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate
because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex.").
10. Harvey v. Blake, 913 F.2d 226, 227 (5th Cir. 1990) (involving male plaintiff's sexual
harassment claim against female supervisor); Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412,418 (7th Cir.
1989) (noting that both men and women can state Title VII claims of sexual harassment), overruled
in part on other grounds, Saxton v. AT&T Co., 10 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 1993).
II. Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662-63 (9th Cir. 1977).
12. Id. See also DeCintio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 825 (1987); Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329
(9th Cir. 1979).
13. See, e.g., Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1089 (1990); DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 333.
14. Dillon v. Frank, 952 F.2d 403 (6th Cir. 1992) (unpublished disposition); Carreno v.
International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 226, 54 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 81 (D. Kan. 1990).
A discussion of sexual orientation harassment and Title VII is beyond the scope of this Comment.
15. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-10 (1lth Cir. 1982); EEOC Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1995).
16. Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 579 (2d Cir. 1989); EEOC Policy
Guidance on Sexual Harassment, 8 Fair. Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 405:6682 (March 19, 1990).
1127
Washington Law Review
1. Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment
In "quid pro quo" sexual harassment, a term of employment is
conditioned upon submission to unwelcome sexual advances.'7 In such a
case, an individual relies on apparent or actual authority to extort sexual
consideration from an employee. 8 For a court to find liability, an
employee must demonstrate that his or her reaction to the sexual
advances affected tangible aspects of the employee's compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. 9
Henson v. City of Dundee articulates the elements necessary to
establish a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim.2 Under this standard,
the plaintiff must prove: (1) the employee is a member of a protected
group; (2) the employee was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment;
(3) the harassment was based on sex; (4) the receipt of an employment
benefit or a tangible job detriment expressly or impliedly depended on
the acceptance or rejection of the harassment by the employee; and (5)
the existence of respondeat superior liability." With some variation,
courts widely follow this basic formulation of the prima facie quid pro
quo case.'
2. Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,23 the U.S. Supreme Court
recognized that sexual harassment that creates a hostile Dr offensive work
environment violates Title VII.24 The Court declared that Title VII grants
individuals the right to work free from discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule, and insult.' Under Meritor, the elements of a hostile
environment sexual harassment claim reflect the quid pro quo
requirements, but the fourth element differs: "The harassment
complained of affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment and
was sufficiently severe and pervasive so as to alter the conditions of
17. Henson, 682 F.2d at 910.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 909.
20. Id. at 909-10.
21. Id.
22. Barbara Lindemann & David D. Kadu., Sexual Harassment in Employment Law 132 (1992).
23. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
24. Id. at 67-68.
25. Id. at 65.
1128
Vol. 70:1125, 1995
Same-Gender Sexual Harassment
employment and create an abusive working environment." '6 As in the
quid pro quo prima facie case, courts commonly follow this
formulation.
In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,28 the U.S. Supreme Court declared
that, in determining whether an environment is hostile or abusive, the
trier of fact must examine the totality of the circumstances.29 Such
circumstances may include the severity and frequency of the
discriminatory behavior; whether it involves physical threats or
humiliation, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably
interferes with an employee's ability to perform his or her work." In
contrast to quid pro quo sexual harassment, the employee alleging hostile
work environment need not prove the actual or threatened loss of a
tangible job benefit to recover." Also, there is no requirement that the
conduct seriously affect the employee's psychological well-being or
cause the employee injury. 2
Further, an actionable hostile environment claim need not involve
conduct that is explicitly sexual in nature.3 Harassment that lacks sexual
overtones but is motivated by a gender-based animus may create a
hostile environment if it is sufficiently severe or pervasive. 4 Such
gender-based harassment resembles harassment based on race or national
origin35 and may include unwarranted criticism, ridicule, insults, and
epithets.36
26. Id. at 67 (citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,904 (1lth Cir. 1982)).
27. Lindemann & Kadue, supra note 22, at 169.
28. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
29. Id. at371.
30. Id.
31. Mentor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
32. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 371.
33. Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988).
34. Id. See also Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (3d Cir. 1990); Hicks v.
Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1415 (10th Cir. 1987); Bell v. Crackin Good Bakers, Inc., 777
F.2d 1497, 1503 (11th Cir. 1985); McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1985); EEOC
Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, 8 Fair. Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 405:6692 (Mar. 19, 1990).
35. Lindemann & Kadue, supra note 22, at 75. See also Joshua F. Thorpe, Note, Gender-Based
Harassment and the Hostile Work Environment, 1990 Duke L.J. 1361.
36. Thorpe, supra note 35, at 1363.
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II. TREATMENT OF SAME-GENDER SEXUAL HARASSMENT
UNDER TITLE VII
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) places
same-gender sexual harassment within the purview of Title VII, and the
federal courts once did so uniformly. However, courts now conflict
regarding the applicability of Title VII to same-gender sexual
harassment. This section describes the treatment of same-gender sexual
harassment under Title VII and the development of the split among the
courts.
A. The Interpretation by the EEOC
The EEOC recognizes same-gender sexual harassment as actionable
under Title VII. The EEOC Compliance Manual provides:
The victim does not have to be of the opposite sex from the
harasser. Since sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination,
the crucial inquiry is whether the harasser treats a member or
members of one sex differently from members of the other sex. The
victim and the harasser may be of the same sex where, for instance,
the sexual harassment is based on the victim's sex (not on the
victim's sexual preference) and the harasser does not treat
employees of the opposite sex the same way.37
These guidelines constitute an administrative interpretation of the
Civil Rights Act by the agency charged with its enforcement.38 Although
the guidelines are not controlling upon the courts, they form a body of
experience and informed judgment to guide courts and litigants.39 The
Compliance Manual suggests that the EEOC understands that the
consequences of same-gender sexual harassment are substantially similar
to those of sexual harassment between members of different genders.
37. EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 615.2(b)(3) at 130.
38. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424,433-34 (1971)).
39. Id. (citing General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976)>.
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B. Recognition of Same-Gender Sexual Harassment Claims by
Federal Courts
Historically, federal courts recognized the validity of Title VII same-
gender sexual harassment claims.4" Courts initially addressed same-
gender sexual harassment in dicta in several early sexual harassment
decisions. In Barnes v. Costle,41 one of the first cases to recognize a Title
VII cause of action for sexual harassment, the court's dicta suggested
that same-gender sexual advances could also give rise to a claim for
sexual harassment.42 It posited that where a homosexual superior harasses
a subordinate of either gender, courts are faced with a legal problem
identical to that in the situation of a male harassing a female-the
imposition of a condition that, but for his or her sex, the employee would
not have faced.43 Similarly, the court in Bundy v. Jackson' maintained in
dicta that sexual harassment is no less "because of sex" when it involves
a female harassing a subordinate male or a superior of either sex
harassing a subordinate of the same sex."
Courts in early sexual harassment decisions also confronted in dicta
the issue of a bisexual harasser. According to these cases, sexual
advances against members of both sexes would fail to give rise to a claim
for sexual harassment.46 In such situations, these opinions asserted, the
sexual harassment would not constitute gender discrimination because
40. Several states have recognized this form of sexual harassment under corresponding state law.
See Mogilefsky v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 116 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that cause of
action for sexual harassment in violation of Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(h) may be stated by member of
same sex as harasser); Barbour v. Department of Social Serv., 497 N.W.2d 216 (Mich. 1993)
(finding Michigan Civil Rights Act proscribed alleged same-gender sexual advances directed at
employee by his supervisor); Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445 (N.J. 1993) (stating that
New Jersey statute applied to sexual harassment occurring between members of the same gender).
These cases demonstrate the willingness of some courts to define same-gender sexual harassment as
discrimination. However, this Comment does not specifically address such state cases because they
fail to guide the analysis under federal law.
41. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
42. Id. at 990 n.55.
43. Id.
44. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
45. Id. at 942 n.7. See also Catherine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women 206
(1979) ("A woman who is fired because of her refusal to submit to a lesbian supervisor is just as
fired-and her firing is just as related to her gender-as if the perpetrator were a man.").
46. Bundy, 641 F.2d at 942 n.7 ("Only by a reductio ad absurdum could we imagine a case of
harassment that is not sex discrimination-where a bisexual supervisor harasses men and women
alike."). See also Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,904 (1 lth Cir. 1982); Barnes, 561 F.2d at
990 n.55.
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the alleged conduct applies to male and female employees alike and
consequently would not be based upon sex.47
For a number of years, courts actually confronting same-gender sexual
harassment accepted it as within the purview of Title VII. 48 These
conclusions for the most part followed particularly brief discussions of
the issue. Accordingly, the case law acknowledging that Title VII
prohibits same-gender sexual harassment lends little guidance to the
analysis.
Perhaps the most recognized case finding Title VII coverage for same-
gender sexual harassment claims is Wright v. Methodist Youth Services,
Inc.49 In Wright, the male plaintiff brought a quid pro quo cause of action
claiming that his male supervisor fired him because be had refused the
supervisor's overt sexual advances.5 The court noted that the supervisor
allegedly made a demand of a male employee that would not be directed
to a female, and cited Barnes for the proposition that "but for" his sex,
the plaintiff would not have faced the harassment." The court in Wright
thus concluded that Title VII prohibits same-gender sexual harassment. 2
In addition, at least two appellate courts refused to explicitly reject
same-gender sexual harassment claims when presented with an
opportunity to do so. The Ninth Circuit recognized a hostile environment
sexual harassment cause of action that involved members of the same
47. Henson, 682 F.2d at 904; Barnes, 561 F.2d at 990 n.55.
48. Showalter v. Allison Reed Group, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 1205 (D.R.I. 1991) (finding cause of
action where supervisor coerced plaintiffs to both observe and engage in sexual relationship between
him and female employee), affd sub noma. Phetosomphone v. Allison Reed Group, Inc., 984 F.2d 4
(Ist Cir. 1993); Parrish v. Washington Nat. Ins. Co., No. 89-C-4515, 199D WL 165611, at *7 n.2
(N.D. I. Oct. 16, 1990) (unpublished disposition) (recognizing coverage of same-gender claims
under Title VII although alleged conduct failed to rise to level of ho,tile environment sexual
harassment); Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537, 541 (M.D. Ala. 1983) (upholding
male plaintiffs claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment based on male supervisor's advances);
Wright v. Methodist Youth Serv., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. I1. 1981) (aoncluding that Title VII
prohibits same-gender sexual harassment); Barlow v. Northwestern Memoial Hosp., 30 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 223, 224 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (upholding female plaintff's claim alleging that
demotion resulted from refusal to accede to female supervisor's sexual advances). Cf. Polly v.
Houston Lighting & Power Co., 825 F. Supp. 135, 137 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (holding that issue need not
be reached in present case, but declining to find Title VII inapplicable to same-gender sexual
harassment). See also Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 148 (2d Cir. 1993) (Van
Graafeiland, J., concurring) (observing in dicta that harassment is harassment regardless of whether
perpetrator is member of same or opposite gender), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1189 (1994).
49. 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. I1. 1981).
50. Id. at 309-10.
51. Id. at310.
52. Id.
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gender in EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel." In Hacienda Hotel, female
employees alleged that two supervisors, a male and a female, subjected
them to disparaging and sexually offensive comments. 4 Although the
court neglected to specifically address the validity of the claim on the
basis of the same-gender issue, it found that the severity and
pervasiveness of the harassment altered the terms and conditions of
employment." The court therefore held the employer liable for the sexual
harassment by both supervisors. 6
The First Circuit confronted same-gender sexual harassment in
Morgan v. Massachusetts General Hospital.57 A male employee brought
a hostile environment claim based on unwanted sexual attention by a
male co-worker. 8 Without discussing the same-gender element of the
claim, the court stated that a Title VII cause of action for sexual
harassment existed, but determined that the alleged conduct failed to rise
to a level of actionable sexual harassment. 9
C. Conflict Among the Courts
Beginning in 1994, many federal decisions have refused to extend
Title VII coverage to victims of same-gender sexual harassment. In doing
so, these cases have relied on the reasoning set forth in a 1988 case,
Goluszek v. Smith.' In Goluszek, a federal district court declined to
recognize sexual harassment because the victim and the alleged
perpetrator were members of the same gender.6'
1. Goluszek v. Smith
Goluszek involved a young man from an unsophisticated background
who blushed easily and was "abnormally sensitive" to comments
pertaining to sex.6' Goluszek's co-workers subjected him to a barrage of
sexually explicit comments, references to a perceived lack of sexual
53. 881 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir. 1989).
54. Id. at 1507-08.
55. Id. at 1515.
56. Id. at 1515-16.
57. 901 F.2d 186 (Ist Cir. 1990).
58. Id. at 188.
59. Id. at 192-93.
60. 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. 1Il. 1988).
61. Id. at 1456.
62. Id. at 1453.
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experience and prowess, and remarks questioning his sexual
orientation.' They also poked him in the buttocks with a stick.'
The court found that Goluszek easily rebutted the defendant's
argument that Goluszek could not prove that his co--workers harassed
him because of his sex.6" The court then stated that a fact-finder could
reasonably conclude that the employer would have taken action to stop
the harassment if the plaintiff had been a woman,66 that such action
would have stopped the harassment, and that the harassment was
pervasive and continuous from the time Goluszek begaa working until he
was fired.67 The court also conceded that a wooden application of the
verbal formulations created by the courts interpreting Title VII would
dictate recognition of the plaintiffs claim.68 Nevertheless, the court
granted summary judgment to the defendant.69
In denying Goluszek's cause of action, the court adopted a reading of
Title VII that it claimed was consistent with the "underlying concerns" of
Congress, contending that Congress did not intend to forbid conduct such
as the defendant's when it enacted Title VII. 70 According to the court,
Congress was concerned about discrimination resulting from an
imbalance of power that affected a discrete and vulnerable group.7' The
court asserted that in the context of sexual harassment this meant a
powerful person exploiting a less powerful individual through the
imposition of sexual demands or pressures.72 Next, the court emphasized
that the plaintiff was a male in a male-dominated environment and that
63. Id. at 1453-54.
64. Id. at 1454. These allegations make it difficult to determine whether the conduct constituted
gender discrimination or merely abusive treatment with sexual overtones. One could perhaps view
the plaintiff as a victim of discriminatory harassment under a sex stereotype theory. Goluszek's co-
workers harassed him in part based on his failure to conform to traditional stereotyped notions of
what it means to be male. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), the Supreme Court
held that discrimination based on a sex stereotype violates Title VII. Nevertheless, a detailed
examination of this issue is beyond the scope of this Comment.
65. Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456.
66. Id. When Goluszek complained to his supervisor about the sexual harassment, no action was
taken. Id. at 1454. However, evidence existed that the employer reacted differently to female claims
of sexual harassment. Id. at 1455.
67. Id. at 1456.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. (citing Note, Sexual Harassment Claims ofAbusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97
Harv. L. Rev. 1449, 1451-52 (1984)).
1134
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he did not work in an environment that treated males as inferior.'3
Although the court acknowledged that Goluszek may have been harassed
because he was male, it stated that the harassment was not the type that
created an anti-male environment in the workplace.74 For these reasons,
the court concluded that the cause of action failed. 5
2. Application of Goluszek Reasoning by Other Courts
In 1994, the Fifth Circuit dismissed a same-gender hostile
environment sexual harassment claim in Garcia v. Elf Atochem North
America,76 flatly holding that a male plaintiff alleging harassment by a
male supervisor failed to state a claim under Title VII even though the
harassment had sexual overtones.77 The court cited Goluszek and simply
stated that the statute addresses gender discrimination, implying that
same-gender sexual harassment does not constitute such discrimination.78
Subsequently, district courts in several circuits have followed suit.79
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994).
77. Id. at 451-52. The plaintiff alleged that on several occasions his supervisor had approached
from behind, grabbed Garcia's crotch area, and made sexual motions from behind him. The
employer viewed this conduct as "horseplay." Id. at 448.
78. Id. at 451-52. The court also mentioned a Fifth Circuit unpublished opinion, Giddens v. Shell
Oil Co., No. 92-8533 (5th Cir. Dec. 6, 1993), in which it had reached the same conclusion.
79. Ashworth v. Roundup Co., 897 F. Supp. 489 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (rejecting actionability of
same-gender sexual harassment claim under Title VII where male perpetrator made sexually explicit
comments to victim, propositioned him, made offensive physical contact with him, and threatened
him with sexual violence); Benekritis v. Johnson, 882 F. Supp. 521 (D.S.C. 1995) (denying same-
gender sexual harassment as cognizable claim under Title VII where male plaintiff alleged that on
multiple occasions a male co-worker placed his genitals against plaintiff's backside and made
physical contact with plaintiff's genitals); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., 67 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 769 (E.D. La. 1995) (finding no cause of action where plaintiff alleged specific physical
acts and verbal assaults perpetrated by same-gender co-workers); Myers v. City of El Paso, 874 F.
Supp. 1546 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (declining to recognize a Title VII claim where female plaintiff
alleged unwelcome sexual advances by female supervisor); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co.,
871 F. Supp. 822 (D. Md. 1994) (dismissing male plaintiff's same-gender hostile environment sexual
harassment claim alleging that supervisor had subjected plaintiff to jokes, comments, and gestures of
a sexual nature); Fleenor v. Hewitt Soap Co., 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1625 (S.D. Ohio 1994)
(denying Title VII cause of action where same-gender co-workers allegedly created hostile
environment through threats of sexual assault, unwelcome sexual contact, and sexually explicit
language). Cf. Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'l Corp., 867 F. Supp. 790 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (holding that
Title VII does not reach same-gender sexual harassment), modified, 887 F. Supp. 1178, 1179-81
(N.D. Ind. 1995) (asserting that the previous holding may have been overbroad, the court maintained
that the holding was fact-specific and declined to decide whether same-gender sexual harassment can
ever be actionable under Title VII).
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In Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co.,8" the court dismissed the
plaintiff's same-gender hostile environment action and elaborated on the
reasoning set forth in Goluszek.5 l The court asserted that it seemed
peculiar to find sex discrimination when sexual harassment is of a male
by a male, or of a female by a female.82 The court contended that what
the harasser is really doing is preferring or selecting a member of the
same gender for sexual attention, however unwelcome that attention may
be.83 It further reasoned that the harasser certainly "does not despise the
entire group nor wish to harm its members because the harasser is also a
member and finds others of the group sexually attractive."84 Hopkins then
cites Goluszek at length and held that where the harasser and the alleged
victim belong to the same gender, the court would strain the language of
the statute beyond its manifest intent if it found that discrimination
"because of sex" existed.85
3. Other Recent Decisions Decline To Adopt the Goluszek Rationale
In contrast to the cases denying Title VII coverage to victims of same-
gender sexual harassment, other district court decisions expressly reject
the Goluszek holding and rationale.8 6 These decisions primarily rely on
80. 871 F. Supp. 822 (D. Md. 1994).
81. Id. at 831-35.
82. Id. at 833 (citing Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective
Paradigm, 8 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 333, 351-52 (1990)).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 834.
86. Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire, 887 F. Supp. 1133 (C.D. Il. 1995) (holding that male
employee stated a cause of action for same-gender sexual harassment based upon male supervisor's
alleged unwelcome sexual advances and physical contact of a sexual nature,,; EEOC v. Walden Book
Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100 (M.D. Tenn. 1995) (finding same-gender sexual harassment actionable under
Title Vii); Pritchett v. Sizeler Real Estate Mgmt. Co., 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1377 (E.D.
La. 1995) (holding Title VII cause of action existed for same-gender, h:stile work environment
sexual harassment); Boyd v. Vonnahmen, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1769 (S.D. II!. 1995)
(declining to read Title VII as applicable only to typical form of sexual harassment); Roe v. K-Mart
Corp., No. CIV.A.2:93-2372-18AJ, 1995 WL 316783 (D.S.C. Mar. 28, 1995) (finding same-gender
sexual harassment prohibited by Title VII under both hostile environment and quid pro quo theories
of liability); McCoy v. Johnson Controls World Serv., 878 F. Supp. 229 (S.D. Ga. 1995)
(recognizing viable Title VII claim where female plaintiff alleged that her female supervisor made
uninvited sexual contact on several occasions); Prescott v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co.,
878 F. Supp. 1545 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (recognizing same-gender sexual harassment claim where male
alleged quid pro quo sexual harassment pursuant to male supervisor's unwanted sexual advances).
The fact that Pritchett and Roe both conflict with cases decided by other judges in the same districts,
see supra note 79, illustrates the breadth of confusion regarding same-gender sexual harassment.
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the plain meaning of Title VII 7 and the fact that the conduct complained
of was based on sex.88 Part III elaborates on these arguments and
advances others in advocating Title VII coverage of same-gender sexual
harassment by all courts.
III. SAME-GENDER SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND THE SCOPE
OF TITLE VII
Same-gender sexual harassment claims fall within the purview of Title
VII as impermissible discrimination. An examination of the statutory
construction indicates that Title VII fails to make distinctions based on
gender, thus providing no express or implied exclusion of coverage to
victims of same-gender sexual harassment. Additionally, in the face of
this evidence, courts declining to recognize same-gender sexual
harassment under Title VII fail to produce any rational basis for
distinguishing between this type of harassment and the more typical
form. Finally, rather than attempt to create these distinctions, courts
should focus on the discriminatory and unwelcome nature of the conduct
itself.
A. Recognizing a Title VII Cause of-Action Conforms with the
Statutory Construction
Title VII lacks gender-based limitations. Nothing in the statute's plain
language, its legislative history, or the U.S. Supreme Court's
interpretation indicates that Title VII's coverage of sexual harassment is
restricted to situations where the victim and the harasser are members of
different genders. Consequently, acknowledging the viability of same-
gender sexual harassment claims under Title VII is in no way
contradictory to the statute.
See also Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428,430(7th Cir. 1995) (indicating in dicta that
although sexual harassment of women by men is the most common kind, the court "[did] not mean to
exclude the possibility that sexual harassment of... men by other men, or women by other women,
would not also be actionable in appropriate cases").
87. Griffith, 887 F. Supp. at 1136; Walden, 885 F. Supp. at 1103; Boyd, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 1771; McCoy, 878 F. Supp. at 232; Prescott, 878 F. Supp. at 1550.
88. Griffith, 887 F. Supp. at 1137; Walden, 885 F. Supp. at 1103-04; Pritchett, 67 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1378-79; Boyd, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1770-71; Roe, No.
CIV.A.2:93-2372-18AJ, 1995 WL 316783, at *2; McCoy, 878 F. Supp. at 232; Prescott, 878 F.
Supp. at 1550-51.
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1. The Plain Meaning of Title VII
Where the language of a statute is plain, a court's sole function is to
enforce the statute according to its terms. 9 Title VII protects against
discriminatory treatment of either gender. The statute declares that sex
discrimination by an employer is prohibited "against any individual."9
The plain meaning prohibits discrimination against women because they
are women and against men because they are men.9'
Nothing in the language of the statute suggests that Title VII coverage
is limited to discrimination against an individual of one gender by a
member of the other gender.92 Neither would the language of the statute
be strained beyond its manifest intent, as the Hopkins court maintained,93
if a court found that sex discrimination existed in a same-gender case.
Accordingly, a finding that Title VII encompasses same-gender sexual
harassment conforms with the language of the statute.
2. The Legislative History of Title VII
The scant legislative history regarding sex and Title VII suggests that
the statute protects everyone from discrimination based on sex,
regardless of gender. While debating whether to add the prohibition
against discrimination based on sex, members of the House of
Representatives had a discussion indicating that Title VII would cover
both men and women.94 Therefore, at the time of Title VII's enactment, it
appears Congress intended to protect all citizens, male or female, from
sex discrimination.
89. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
91. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984).
92. Griffith, 887 F. Supp. at 1136; Boyd, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1771; McCoy, 878 F.
Supp. at 232, Prescott, 878 F. Supp. at 1550.
93. Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 822, 834 (D. Md- 1994).
94. House members had the following discussion:
Mrs. Griffiths: I would like to ask the chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, the
gentleman from New York, a question. Mr. Chairman, is it your judgment that this bill will
protect colored men and colored women at the hiring gate equally?
Mr. Celler This bill is all-embracing and will cover everybody in the United States.
Mrs. Griffiths: It will cover every colored man and every colored women?
Mr. Celler: Yes, it will cover white men and white women and all Ameiicans.
110 Cong. Rec. 2578 (1964).
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But the prohibition against discrimination based on sex was added to
the Civil Rights Act at the last minute on the floor of the House of
Representatives.95 Because the bill passed shortly thereafter, very limited
legislative history exists to guide interpretations of the Act's prohibition
against discrimination on the basis of sex.96 As previously noted, Title
VII specifically fails to address sexual harassment.97 Further, a federal
court did not even recognize sexual harassment as discrimination on the
basis of sex until over a decade after the statute was enacted.98 Thus, the
current sexual harassment doctrine is entirely a judicial creation.
Consequently, decisions denying same-gender sexual harassment
claims rest on faulty assumptions when proclaiming the "underlying
concerns" of Congress and when maintaining that the conduct alleged
was not of the type Congress intended to prohibit when it enacted Title
VII.99 Such cases cite no evidence for this position because so little
legislative history of the Act exists regarding discrimination based on sex
and because no legislative history specifically addressed sexual
harassment. There is simply nothing in the legislative history suggesting
that courts should not apply Title VII literally. Therefore, the legislative
history of Title VII provides no justification for the position that the
statute covers sexual harassment between members of opposite genders
but not sexual harassment between those of the same gender.
3. The U.S. Supreme Court's Interpretation of Title VII
Two leading U.S. Supreme Court cases set forth broad interpretations
of what constitutes sexual harassment and who Title VII protects. The
Court declared in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. that the language of
Title VII "evinces a congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum
of disparate treatment of men and women in employment."0° Similarly,
in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the Court stated that requiring "a
man or a woman to run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the
privilege of being allowed to work and make a living can be as
demeaning and disconcerting as racial harassment."' 0 ' Nothing in the
95. Id. at 2577-84.
96. Mentor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
97. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
100. 114 S. Ct. 367,370 (1993) (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64) (emphasis added).
101. 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982))
(emphasis added).
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Court's decisions suggests that the gender of the victim or the perpetrator
affects the applicability of Title VII to the harassing conduct.
B. No Rational Basis Exists for Distinguishing Same-Gender Sexual
Harassment from Different-Gender Sexual Harassment
In denying coverage to victims of same-gender sexual harassment,
courts have relied on several factors. These factors include the absence of
a dominant group discriminating against a socially disempowered
group,"2 the lack of an environment oppressive to all members of the
protected group to which plaintiff belongs, 3 and the supposed inability
of a harasser to discriminate against a victim of the same gender 4
However, the use of these factors is misguided and fails to adequately
distinguish same-gender sexual harassment from typical sexual
harassment.
1. An Actionable Title VII Claim Need Not Involve Discrimination of a
Powerless Group by a Dominant Group
Courts declining to prohibit same-gender sexual 'harassment under
Title VII have maintained that the problem Congress sought to remedy
was discrimination resulting from an imbalance of power.' In the
context of sexual harassment, this meant a person belonging to a
powerful social group exploiting someone from a less powerful group. 6
This assertion is inaccurate and conflicts with the current state of anti-
discrimination jurisprudence.
Title VII's protections plainly are not limited to women, minorities,
and other disempowered groups. 7 Employers may not treat similarly
situated employees differently solely because they diffbr with respect to
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.' It is innaterial whether
the discrimination is directed against members of majorities or
minorities.'0 9 If courts determined Title VII coverage by the amount of
102. Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456.
103. Id.
104. Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 822, 833 (D. Md. 1994).
105. E.g., Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456.
106. Id. (citing Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII,
97 Harv. L. Rev. 1449, 1451-52 (1984)).
107. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
108. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 71 (1977).
109. Id. See also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,431 (1971).
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power possessed by the employee's social group relative to the
perpetrator's social group, male employees would lack protection, as
would white employees in racial discrimination cases.
Title VII protects men from sex discrimination just as it protects
women.' 0 This protection extends to the context of sexual harassment,
where male employees have stated claims against females even though
the plaintiffs are members of the dominant group and the harassers
belong to a less powerful group."' The U.S. Supreme Court has
expressly acknowledged the validity of such claims." 2
Furthermore, when interpreting Title VII, the Court consistently has
applied the same standard to proscribe discrimination in private
employment against both whites and non-whites." 3 For example, in
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.,"4 the Court held that
Title Vil's terms are not limited to discrimination against members of
any particular race." 5 Thus, the fact that racial minorities possess less
power than whites in the workplace does not eliminate the applicability
of Title VII to a white person's claim of racial discrimination.
In addition, although Goluszek and subsequent cases insisted on a
nexus between social disempowerment and discrimination in the
workplace, this is not an element of a prima facie case of sexual
harassment." 6 Neither has other hostile environment harassment case law
required that a plaintiff specifically demonstrate such a nexus in order to
state a Title VII claim."7 Such a social disempowerment requirement
110. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
111. See, e.g., Harvey v. Blake, 913 F.2d 226, 227 (5th Cir. 1990).
112. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
113. Prescott v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1545, 1550 (citing McDonald
v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279 (1976)). See also Calcote v. Texas Educ. Found.,
Inc., 578 F.2d 95, 96 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that white plaintiff stated prima facie case of racial
discrimination); Carter v. Community Action Agency, 625 F. Supp. 199, 204 (M.D. Ala. 1985)
(stating that white plaintiff made a prima facie case of racial discrimination involving black
supervisor); Lucero v. Beth Israel Hosp. & Geriatric Ctr., 479 F. Supp. 452, 454 (D. Colo. 1979)
(finding evidence sufficient to conclude black supervisor engaged in racial discrimination against
non-black employees, including white plaintiff).
114. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
115. Id. at 278-80.
116. See supra notes 21 and 26 and accompanying text.
117. The prima facie elements of a hostile environment claim based on race or national origin
tend to reflect those found in the hostile environment sexual harassment prima facie case, with slight
variation. See, e.g., Bivins v. Jeffers Vet Supply, 873 F. Supp. 1500 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (stating that
elements of a prima facie case of racially hostile work environment include: plaintiff was a member
of a protected class; plaintiff was subjected to unwelcome racial harassment; harassment was based
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lacks justification and cannot form a valid basis on which to distinguish
same-gender sexual harassment from different-gender sexual harassment.
2. Title VII Does Not Require the Existence of an Environment
Oppressive to All Members of the Protected Group
Decisions denying coverage to victims of sarae-gender sexual
harassment cite a lack of an environment oppressive to members of the
protected group to which the plaintiff belongs. For example, the court in
Goluszek emphasized that the plaintiff was a male in a male-dominated
environment, that he did not work in an environment that treated males
as inferior, and that the harassment did not create an "anti-male
environment in the workplace." '118 The court's reasoning implies that the
work environment must discriminatorily affect the protected group in its
entirety rather than simply the individual plaintiff. Fowever, it is not
essential to a Title VII cause of action that the discrimination be directed
at all members of the group." 9 Title VII's protections apply to any
"individual." 120
Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has focused its attention on the
individual in determining whether discrimination has occurred. In
Connecticut v. Teal,'2 the Court declared that Congress never intended
to give an employer license to discriminate against some employees on
the basis of race or sex merely because the employer treats other
members of the employees' group favorably." And in Los Angeles
Department of Water & Power v. Manhart," the Court recognized that
fairness to a class of women employees as a whole does not justify
unfairness to an individual female employee. 24 In so holding, the court
found Title VII's focus on the individual to be unambiguous. 125
on race; harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and respondeat
superior).
118. Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. I11. 1988).
119. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982); Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart,
435 U.S. 702 (1978); Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 991 (1971).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
121. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
122. Id. at 455.
123. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
124. Id. at708.
125. Id.
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Focusing on the individual makes particular sense in the realm of
sexual harassment. This is so, in part, because the harasser may single
out one employee as a victim. However, the fact that a specific individual
is subject to sexual harassment does not contradict the assertion that the
harassment is based on gender and therefore sex discrimination.
Furthermore, the prima facie case of sexual harassment emphasizes the
individual by focusing solely on the employee bringing the claim.'26
3. A Victim of the Same Gender Does Not Definitively Inhibit the
Perpetrator from Committing Discriminatory Behavior
The suggestion that a supervisor or employee cannot discriminate
against a member of his or her gender group is erroneous. In Hopkins v.
Baltimore Gas & Electric Co., the court contended that an individual
cannot discriminate against someone of the same gender because the
individual does not wish to harm members of his or her own gender
because of their gender.'27 However, membership in a particular social
group fails to disqualify someone from discriminating against an
individual in that same social group.
The scenarios of the same-gender sexual harassment cases themselves
demonstrate this point. For instance, in Joyner v. AAA Cooper
Transportation,2 ' the male plaintiff brought a quid pro quo sexual
harassment claim based on his male supervisor's unwanted advances.'29
The plaintiff alleged that his supervisor had invited him into his
automobile, and while inside, had placed his hands on the plaintiff's
private parts, asking him to engage in sexual activities.13 The plaintiff
rejected the advances, and his supervisor later threatened him with
termination.'' Shortly thereafter, the employer terminated the plaintiff
because of a slowdown in business.'32 But when business sufficiently
increased to recall the plaintiff, his supervisor refused to do so.' 33 In
concluding that the plaintiff had proven his claim of sexual harassment,
the court found that he was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment to
126. See supra notes 21 and 26 and accompanying text.
127. 871 F. Supp. 822, 833 (D. Md. 1994).
128. 597 F. Supp. 537 (M.D. Ala. 1983).
129. Id. at 538.
130. Id. at 539.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 540.
133. Id.
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which members of the opposite sex had not been subjected.'34
Undoubtedly, the circumstances of Joyner illustrate the discriminatory
nature of the supervisor's treatment of the victim, even though both
parties belonged to the same gender.
Furthermore, case law outside the realm of sexual harassment
recognizes the existence of intra-group discrimination. The U.S.
Supreme Court held in Castaneda v. Partida.3 . that it could not be
presumed as a matter of law that individuals of one definable group will
not discriminate against other members within their group.136 In addition,
the court in Hansborough v. City of Elkhart Parks & Recreation
Department.37 held that discrimination by a black person against another
black person because of race violates Title VII. 38 And in Franceschi v.
Hyatt Corp.,'39 the court found discrimination by one Puerto Rican
against another Puerto Rican actionable under a related statute, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981.140
Finally, in sexual harassment cases it is immaterial whether the
perpetrator wishes to harm the victim. The inquiry need not delve into
the motivation of the harasser because sexual harassment takes various
forms. The proposition that harassment must necessarily demonstrate
antagonism is incorrect. Title VII is not a fault-based tort scheme.'
4
'
Thus, the absence of discriminatory intent fails to redeem an otherwise
unlawful employment practice. 42 For instance, compliments by well-
intentioned co-workers or supervisors can support a sexual harassment
cause of action if the remarks are sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to
alter a condition of employment and create an abusive working
environment. 143 Accordingly, the perpetrator need not actually wish to
cause harm to illegally discriminate against the victim.
134. Id. at 542-43.
135. 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (holding that Mexican-American majority ir county population and
governing majority in county elective offices did not dispel presamption of intentional
discrimination where minority of persons summoned for jury duty were Mexican-American).
136. Id. at 499.
137. 802 F. Supp. 199 (N.D. Ind. 1992).
138. Id. at 202-06. See also Walker v. Secretary of Treasury 713 F. Supp. 403, 407-08 (N.D. Ga.
1989) (stating that in Title VII action, it is "not controlling that... a black person is suing a black
person').
139. 782 F. Supp. 712 (D.P.R. 1992).
140. Id. at 723.
141. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 1991).
142. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,432 (1971).
143. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 880.
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C. The Inquiry Should Focus on the Discriminatory and Unwelcome
Nature of the Conduct Itself
Goluszek v. Smith and its progeny exclude an entire class of
harassment victims from the protections of Title VII. Rather than attempt
to create distinctions to justify differential treatment of same-gender
sexual harassment and the more typical form of sexual harassment,
courts should concentrate on the actual conduct alleged so as to protect
all victims of discriminatory treatment based on sex.
The inquiry should focus on whether the perpetrator's actions were
discriminatory. Additionally, courts should examine whether the actions
were unwelcome to the victim. Courts should not inquire as to the sexual
orientation of the harasser, however, because it is irrelevant to their
determination of these matters. If the conduct was discriminatory and
unwelcome, and if it fulfills all the elements of a prima facie sexual
harassment case, it falls within the purview of Title VII.
1. Courts Should Determine Whether the Perpetrator Discriminated
Against the Employee Based on the Employee's Sex
In a sexual harassment case, the victim must demonstrate that the
harassment complained of was based on sex and that "but for" the fact of
the victim's sex, he or she would not have been the object of the
harassment.'" Sexual harassment is no less "because of sex" or any less
discriminatory in a same-gender case. Sex discrimination violates Title
VII whenever sex is, for no legitimate reason, a substantial factor in the
discrimination.14 When an individual sexually harasses an employee of
the same gender, but fails to similarly harass employees of the opposite
gender, that harassed employee has been singled out because of gender.
Case law recognizing same-gender sexual harassment almost uniformly
bases its holding on the fact that the employee can demonstrate that the
perpetrator would not have harassed the victim "but for" the victim's
gender.146
144. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (1 1th Cir. 1982).
145. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934,942 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
146. See supra notes 41-52 and accompanying text. See also Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire,
887 F. Supp. 1133, 1137 (C.D. 111. 1995); EEOC v. Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1103-04
(M.D. Tenn. 1995); Pritchett v. Sizeler Real Estate Mgmt. Co., 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1377, 1378-79 (E.D. La. 1995); Boyd v. Vonnahmen, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1769, 1770-
71 (S.D. Ill. 1995); Roe v. K-Mart, No. CIV.A.2:93-2372-18AJ, 1995 WL 316783, at *1 (D.S.C.
March 28, 1995); McCoy v. Johnson Controls World Serv., 878 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D. Ga. 1995);
Prescott v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1545, 1550-51 (M.D. Ala. 1995).
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Inevitably, scenarios will arise in which an employee is a victim of
mistreatment that has sexual overtones, yet the behavior fails to qualify
as gender discrimination. In such situations, Title VII is not invoked.
Same-gender sexual harassment cases often may necessitate fact-specific
inquiries into the existence of discrimination and, therefore, Title VII
coverage for the alleged conduct.
2. Courts Should Examine Whether the Conduct Is Unwelcome
To state a Title VII cause of action, the conduct alleged need not only
be discriminatory. According to the U.S. Supreme Cotrit, "The gravamen
of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were
'unwelcome.""' 47 The plaintiff must show that he or she perceived the
conduct as undesirable or offensive and that it was not solicited or
invited.48 If the alleged conduct was in fact both discriminatory and
unwelcome, courts will view it as having altered the conditions of the
victim's employment.'49
Unwelcome sexual advances, ridicule, intimidation, and other
harassing acts are no less injurious and degrading to someone of the
harasser's same gender than they are to an individual of the opposite
gender. Title VII is aimed at the consequences of. an employment
practice rather than at the particular motivation of supervisors or co-
workers. 5 By illustration, the factors set forth by he U.S. Supreme
Court in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. for determining the existence of
a hostile environment sexual harassment claim make rto reference to the
gender of the victim in relation to the harasser.' Instead, these factors
focus exclusively on the circumstances surrounding the harassing
conduct and the effect it has on the victim.'52 The Court recognized that a
discriminatorily abusive work environment can detrimentally affect the
workplace by detracting from employees' job performance, discouraging
employees from remaining on the job, or keeping them from advancing
in their careers."' Thus, the emphasis of the Court is on the nature and
effects of the conduct rather than on the gender of the parties.
147. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986). See also McCoy, 878 F. Supp. at 232
(citing Mefitor).
148. Moylan v. Maries County, 792 F.2d 746, 749 (8th Cir. 1986).
149. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993).
150. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 1991).
151. 114 S. Ct. at 370.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 370-71.
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Consequently, in same-gender sexual harassment cases, courts should
focus on the nature and effects of the unwelcome advance.
3. The Sexual Orientation of the Harasser Is Irrelevant
Same-gender sexual harassment decisions have tended to draw
unnecessary distinctions based on the gender and sexual orientation of
both harassers and victims. For example, many of the cases characterize
the alleged same-gender harassment as "homosexual" harassment,5" and
one decision goes as far to suggest that the discrimination that brings a
claim of sexual harassment within the scope of Title VII arises from the
"differentiating libido" of the alleged harasser. ' This inquiry into the
specific sexuality of the parties is needless because the conduct itself is
the appropriate focus.
Further, characterizing same-gender sexual harassment as
"homosexual" harassment creates the need to prove an individual's
sexual preference in a court of law. Such a procedure seems
unnecessarily complicated and intrusive. For that matter, in cases where
the alleged harassment involves a male harasser and a female victim, the
court does not consider the male's assumed heterosexuality. In addition,
inquiring into the sexual orientation of the harasser would contribute
little to the determination because victimization is not always motivated
by attraction; harassment frequently involves issues of power and control
on the part of the harasser.'56
Moreover, distinctions based on the sexual orientation of the harasser
necessitate a reasoning process that renders bisexuals immune from
sexual harassment liability.'57 Such a process is irrational and fails to
adequately acknowledge the discriminatory nature of the treatment
experienced by the victim. Although the methodical harassment of both
male and female employees by a bisexual would not constitute gender
discrimination per se, in any given case the finder-of-fact could conclude
154. See, e.g., Pritchett v. Sizeler Real Estate Mgmt. Co., 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1377,
1379 (E.D. La. 1995) ("To conclude that same gender harassment is not actionable under Title VII is
to exempt homosexuals from the very laws that govern the workplace conduct of heterosexuals.").
155. Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 822, 832 (D. Md. 1994) (citing Vinson
v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330, 1333 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
bane), affd sub nom. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)).
156. MacKinnon, supra note 45, at 220-21.
157. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
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that gender motivated a particular encounter, therefore satisfying the "but
for sex" requirement. 5
Some case law supports the concept that harassing employees of both
genders does not shield an individual from liability. In Chiapuzio v. BLT
Operating Corp.,5 9 the court stated that the equal harassment of both
genders did not escape the purview of Title VII.' ° It reasoned that where
a harasser violates the rights of both men and women it is conceivable
that each harassed individual is being treated badly because of gender. 6 '
Similarly, in Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co.,62 the: Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit stated that it did not rule out the possibility of viable
claims against the supervisor for sexual harassment by both men and
women in the workplace. 6
For example, if a male experienced sexual harassment based on male
attributes, and a female at the same workplace found herself subjected to
harassment based on female qualities, Title VII should encompass both
employees' claims. The plaintiffs in Chiapuzio alleged this type of
scenario. The Chiapuzio court characterized the defendant as an "equal-
opportunity harasser" whose remarks were gender-driven." It
maintained that the perpetrator harassed the men based on their perceived
lack of sexual prowess and intended to demean and, therefore, harm
them because each was male. 6 The court further found that the
perpetrator harassed the women as objects of his sexuad advances.' 66 The
court concluded that the perpetrator differentially harassed the men and
women because of their particular sex.' 67
In contrast, other situations may arise in which the nature of the
harassment experienced by members of both genders is
158. Lindemann & Kadue, supra note 22, at 148.
159. 826 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Wyo. 1993).
160. Id. at 1337.
161. Id. (citing John I. Donahue, Review Essay: Advocacy Versum, Analysis in Assessing
Employment Discrimination Law, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1583, 1610-11 (1992)).
162. 25 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir. 1994).
163. Id. at 1464. The defendant had argued that the male supervisor harassed males and females
alike and therefore should avoid Title VII liability because his harassment of the female plaintiff was
not based on her gender. Nevertheless, the court determined that the supervisor's abusive treatment
and remarks to women were of a sexual or gender-specific nature, thus justifying the Title VII cause
of action. Id. at 1463-64.
164. Chiapuzio, 826 F. Supp. at 1337.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1338.
167. Id. at 1337-38.
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indistinguishable. By illustration, a supervisor may make identical sexual
advances toward both males and females or may treat them in an equally
abusive manner. In such scenarios, one could not characterize the
conduct as discrimination on the basis of gender. 6 ' If, in fact, the nature
of the harassment were indistinguishable, alternative remedies would be
more appropriate. 69
In any event, the possibility of a bisexual loophole indicates an even
greater need to focus the inquiry in sexual harassment cases on the
unwelcome advance and adverse employment action rather than on the
sexual orientation of the harasser. Whether the harasser is heterosexual,
homosexual, or bisexual is irrelevant. Rather, the emphasis should
remain on the conduct itself.
IV. CONCLUSION
Courts declining to extend Title VII coverage to victims of same-
gender sexual harassment may do so out of fear that allowing such
claims will blur the distinction between harassing conduct that
discriminates based on gender and harassing conduct that has sexual
overtones but lacks such a discriminatory effect. Alternatively, their
refusal may simply stem from a general discomfort with the proposition
that sexual harassment constitutes gender discrimination. Whatever the
case, rather than denying same-gender sexual harassment claims, courts
should recognize the actionability of same-gender sexual harassment by
focusing on the discriminatory and unwelcome nature of the conduct.
Finding Title VII coverage for such harassment will prohibit employers
from ignoring this form of egregious workplace behavior. More
importantly, it will protect all victims of demeaning, discriminatory
treatment based on sex.
168. See, e.g., Gross v. Burgraff Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding that plaintiff
failed to establish a discriminatory hostile work environment because supervisor used crude or harsh
language in reprimanding all of his employees); Sheehan v. Purolator, Inc., 839 F.2d 99, 105 (2d
Cir.) (affirming judgment against hostile environment claim where supervisor's "temper was
manifested indiscriminately toward men and women"), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 891 (1988).
169. Plaintiffs could address the harassment under state employment discrimination statutes. They
could also pursue state tort claims such as assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Additionally, state employees may assert a violation of their constitutional right to equal protection.
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